LearnOutLoud.com Audio - The Freedom of the Will

Preface
I.I - Concerning the nature of the will
I.II - Concerning the determination of the Will
I.III - Concerning the meaning of the terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, etc.; and of Contingence
I.IV - Of the distinction of natural and moral necessity and inability
I.V - Concerning the notion of liberty, and of moral agency
II.I - Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of liberty of will, consisting in the will's self-determining power
II.II - Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning considered
II.III - Whether any event whatsoever, and volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of its existence
II.IV - Whether volition can arise without a cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul
II.V - Showing, that if the things asserted in these evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and can't help the cause of Arminian liberty; and how (this being the state of the case) Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently
II.VI - Concerning the will's determining in things which are perfectly indifferent, in the view of the mind
II.VII - Concerning the notion of liberty of will consisting in indifference
II.VIII - Concerning the supposed liberty of the will, as opposite to all necessity
II.IX - Of the connection of the acts of the will with the dictates of the understanding
II.X - Volition necessarily connected with the influence of motives; with particular observations on the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and reasonings, about the freedom of the will
II.XI - The evidence of God's certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents
II.XII - God's certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions, as is without all necessity
II.XIII - Whether we suppose the volitions of moral agents to be connected with anything antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian liberty
III.I - God's moral excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy
III.II - The acts of the will of the human soul of Jesus Christ necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy, rewardable, etc.
III.III - The case of such as are given up of god to sin, and of fallen man in general, proves moral necessity and inability to be consistent with blameworthiness
III.IV - Command, and obligation to obedience, consistent with moral inability to obey
III.V - That sincerity of desires and endeavors, which is supposed to excuse in the nonperformance of things in themselves good, particularly considered
III.VI - Liberty of indifference, not only not necessary to virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian notions of liberty and moral agency
III.VII - Arminian notions of moral agency inconsistent with all influence of motive and inducement, in either virtuous or vicious actions
IV.I - The essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and acts of the will, lies not in their cause, but their nature
IV.II - The falseness and inconsistence of that metaphysical notion of action, and agency, which seems to be generally entertained by the defenders of the arminian doctrine concerning liberty, moral agency, etc.
The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to suppose those things which are necessary to be worthy of either Praise or Blame.
IV.IV - It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of mankind, to suppose moral necessity to be consistent with praise and blame, reward and punishment
IV.V - Concerning those objections, that this scheme of necessity renders all means and endeavors for the avoiding of sin, or the obtaining virtue and holiness, vain, and to no purpose; and that it makes men no more than mere machines in affairs of morality and religion
IV.VI - Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained, that it agrees with the stoical doctrine of fate, and the opinions of Mr. Hobbes
IV.VII - Concerning the necessity of the divine will
IV.VIII - Some further objections against the moral necessity of god's volitions considered
IV.IX - Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained, that it makes god the author of sin
IV.X - Concerning sin's first entrance into the world
IV.XI - Of a supposed inconsistence of these principles, with God's moral character
IV.XII - Of a supposed tendency of these principles to atheism and licentiousness
IV.XIII - Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which the Calvinistic doctrine is supported, that it is metaphysical and abstruse
Conclusion
Appendix